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Abstract: 
Drawing upon ethnographic data from mountainous central Crete, a feuding society 
up to the present moment, this article will focus on cases of retaliatory crimes where 
men avenge a relative who was killed before they were born. In these cases, what is 
interesting is that there do not seem to be any factors in the present to fuel the fire of 
a past animosity between the two kinship groups. Instead, these men seek revenge 
looking either for the murderer himself or for one of his male relatives in the places 
where they were forced to emigrate after the commitment of crime in order to avoid 
the perpetuation of violent actions.  Reflecting upon crime in a feuding society as a 
‘cultural trauma’ for the identity of the victim’s kinship group, and elaborating upon the 
ideas that Freud has exposed in his article ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, the ways by 
which a memory of a past crime triggers another crime are explored here.   
 
Key words: Crete, feuding societies, collective memory, blood feud, kinship, 
cultural trauma, psychoanalytic anthropology. 
 
Introduction: Crete as a Feuding Society 
Ethnographers1 have treated blood feud as a form of social conflict carried out 
between kinship groups. The crime transcends personal responsibility and involves 
                                                 
 Lecturer of Social Anthropology, Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete. 
This article is an elaboration of an idea presented at the Conference: Crime, Violence and the Modern 
State-Historical Perspectives, University of Crete-Department of History and Archaeology / SOLON 
Partnership Joint Conference (Rethymno, Crete 9-11 March 2007). I would like to thank the Organisers 
of the Conference for the invitation as well as the Editorial Board of the on-line journal Crimes and 
Misdemeanours: Deviance and the Law in Historical Perspective for the publication of the article.  
1
 For example see: Jacob Black-Michaud, Cohesive Force. Feud in Mediterranean and the Middle East, 
(Basil Blackwell, 1975); Christofer Boehm, Blood Revenge: An Anthropology of Feuding in Montenegro 
and other tribal societies, (University Press of Kansas, 1984); Joseph Ginat., Blood Disputes among 
Bedouin and Rural Arabs in Israel. Revenge, Mediation, Outcasting and Family Honor, (University of 
Pittsburg Press in cooperation with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1987); Margaret Hasluck, 
The Unwritten Law of Albania, (Cambridge University Press, 1954); Roger Gould, ‘Revenge as sanction 
and solidarity display: An analysis of vendettas in nineteenth-century Corsica’, American Sociological 
Review, 65:5 (2000) pp. 682-704. Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society,’ trans. 
P. Sherrard in J. G. Peristiany (ed.) Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (University 
of Chicago Press, 1966) pp. 191-241. More specifically, on revenge and values of symbolic capital in 
Greek society see: John Campbell, ‘Honor and the Devil’ in  Peristiany (ed), Honor and Shame, pp. 141-
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two groups of consanguinities who become either the perpetrators or the victims. The 
existence and the perpetuation of blood feuds in specific societies are associated 
with an ideology of kinship corporation and also with indigenous ideas about values 
of symbolic capital of a man (honour, prestige etc.) or a woman (chastity). In 
particular, an assault on the honour of a man or a woman, whether it is verbal or 
physical, is conceived of as an assault against the whole of his or her kinship group 
and every man of the kinsfolk feels responsible for the defence or the redress.  
 
In the case of Crete, the main characteristics of feud can be summarised as follows. 
In the commission of a crime, the local acceptance is of a collective rather than a 
personal responsibility which stems from a commonly adopted ideology that people 
having the same surname ‘share the same blood’ (ehoun to idio ema). Within these 
frames, vengeance is a form of social conflict between two kinship groups, each 
group being identified by the same surname shared by its members. Also, as a form 
of social conflict between groups it constitutes a ‘total social fact’, analogous to the 
Maussian notion of the ‘gift’.2 In other words, it is not only the original crime that is 
likely to begin a sequence of retaliatory crimes – an ‘exchange of death’ one could 
say –  but the succeeding generations will also be involved, with the two kinship 
groups exchanging also the roles of perpetrator and victim. Above all, feud consists 
of a form of social conflict, which simultaneously has economic, legal, moral, 
religious, mythological and aesthetic consequences. Black-Michaud uses 
ethnographic data to make comparisons between blood feuds of different societies of 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Focusing on the economic and political 
dimensions of the phenomenon, he concludes that the feud  
may be regarded first and foremost as a relationship, that is, as a form 
of communicative behaviour uniting parts of society in alliance and 
locking opposed groups in hostile competition over shared values 
which are exchanged and intensified through such interaction. 3 
 
Ultimately, then, the feud ‘can be regarded as a social system per se’,4 and thus 
coincides with a model of society, the ‘feuding society’. From this point of view, the 
content of social notions about revenge encompasses not only a sequence of 
retaliatory crimes carried out between two sibling groups, but also the totality of local 
                                                                                                                                            
170; John Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a 
Greek Mountain Community (Clarendon Press, 1970); Michael Herzfeld, The Poetics of Manhood 
Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village, (Princeton University Press, 1985). 
2
 Marcell Mauss, The Gift; Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. Ian Cunnison, 
Introduction, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, (Free Press, 1954). 
3
 Black-Michaud, Cohesive Force, p. 208.  
4
 Ibid, p. 171. 
Crimes and Misdemeanours 2/1 (2008) ISSN 1754-0445 
 
62 
 
society in varying degrees. At the heart of this, a past crime is transformed into a 
point of reference for the collective memory of succeeding generations, guiding their 
social actions in terms of the establishment of relationships of either solidarity or 
hostility between the corporate groups, at a social as well as a political level.5 Even 
the potential for the committing  of a crime in certain situations, for example out of 
fear of aggression, provides the means of inaugurating and maintaining a broader 
network of relationships of alliance or defiance in social frameworks of an egalitarian 
ideology that pervades feuding societies.6  
 
Intermarriages between the two opposite kinship groups or inflicted emigrations of 
potential victims are usually adopted as strategies to settle the conflict. However, 
such conflicts never end up in total reconciliation; rather, they ease off for certain 
periods of time. During my fieldwork in the mountain villages of central Crete,7 I 
concluded, in reconstructing cases of feud between families extending over four or 
five generations (from the end of the nineteenth century until the present), that in 
many cases, present social incidents or situations have the power to rekindle a past 
                                                 
5
 Many scholars have focused on aspects of the interconnections between the personal, social and 
political levels of Cretan revenge. During my fieldwork, I explored a contemporary case in detail, in 
which a revenge event inside the same wider kinship group (clan) resulted in the changing of the family 
name of the members of one of the two lineages involved and therefore in the creation of a new kinship 
group. At the political level, the support of the same political party (PASOK) by the two lineages was 
transformed to political opposition. Each lineage now vehemently supported different political parties: 
PASOK and Nea Dimokratia, Aris Tsantiropoulos, ‘I Vendetta sti Sinchroni Orini kentriki Kriti’, pp. 145-
60. Also, Herzfeld pinpoints the interplay of ‘interpatri-goup hostility’ and political ideologies, making 
references to candidates from his fieldwork village during the national and local elections. Specifically, in 
exploring the political campaigns of two candidates for opposing political parties in the national elections 
he writes: ‘Each expressed polite disagreement with the other’s politics, but each also showed respect 
for the other’s person. Every effort was made to avoid reviving the interpatri-group hostility of only a year 
earlier. Instead, the tension that could so easily erupted between the mutually suspicious groups 
represented by the two candidates was ostensibly transformed, thanks to their decorous sense of 
occasion, into a choice between blocs. The ideological debate was scarcely more explicit than the 
personal one, although both candidates made a few half-hearted remarks about the reasons for voting 
for their respective parties. But it was realised by all concerned that any actual confrontation on matters 
of ideological substance could very easily translate into a renewed feud between households or agnatic 
groups, with results that could only be disastrous for the village as a whole’, Herzfeld, Poetics of 
Manhood, p. 113, see also Chapter Three: ‘The Uses of Ideology’, pp. 92-122. For a novelist’s version 
of the above issues, see Rea Galanaki, Amilita Vathia Nera. I Apagogi tis Tasoulas (Kastaniotis editions, 
2006). Galanaki’s novel is based on archival research by the writer about the kidnapping of the daughter 
of a Cretan politician by the brother of his political opponent occurring in Crete in 1950, and the 
transformation of this event into a feud between the two families.  
6
 Egalitarian does not mean equal and refers to institutions and not to whole societies. In Mediterranean 
societies, according to John Davis, the interest in egalitarian institutions is that, in the making of 
important political decisions, they exclude the differences in crude material wealth from consideration. 
That means: ‘the reality of differentiation is socially destroyed instead of being construed to create a 
stratification’, Davis John, People of the Mediterranean. An Essay in Comparative Social Anthropology, 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 111, pp. 110-25). Boehm, in a cross-cultural survey of many 
egalitarian societies, argues that an apparent absence of hierarchy in these societies is the result of 
followers dominating their leaders rather than vice versa, creating a  ‘reverse dominance hierarchy’, C. 
Boehm, ‘Egalitarian Behaviour and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy’, Current Anthropology, 34(3) pp. 
227-54. Boehm’s research indicates that another aspect of egalitarianism is the connection of the 
concept of power with a set of values of symbolic capital, as their existence in the identity of an 
individual is dependent on their recognition from the others. 
7
 These villages lie around Mount Ida (Psiloritis) in the prefecture of Rethymno. 
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conflict between two kinship groups. Within local societies, such incidents as a sheep 
stealing, a wounding, a public verbal insult, or even a car accident where the victim is 
a member of the last victim’s kinship group and the perceived culprit a member of the 
perpetrator group, can reignite a past hatred. This is because their motives acquire 
social significances which are related to the balances of political and social power of 
the involved kinship groups, something which is best understood within the context of 
an egalitarian ideology. 
 
However, in this article, drawing upon my fieldwork, I will concentrate on cases of 
retaliatory killings where there is no present catalytic event to spark into life the 
dormant hatred that would motivate a man of the last victim’s kinship group to commit 
the crime. Instead, for the victim’s kinship group, the killing of a consanguine 
individual in an event occurring one or two generations previously, is likely to become 
integrated into a personal or a family history as a traumatic fact affecting present 
reality rather than as a distant historical incident. Correlating ethnographic data with 
archival material (affidavits, court proceedings etc.), the concentration is on two case 
studies of avengers who were not born when the previous crime was committed. The 
first case relates to a retaliatory crime committed in the Cretan city of Heraklio in 
1987, when a 25-year-old shepherd killed the porter of Heraklio’s public hospital 
while he was at work. The crime was committed in order to take revenge on the 
porter’s uncle who was killed in 1958, that is, five years before the shepherd’s own 
birth. The second case took place more recently. In 2005, a 24-year-old man left a 
village in the Mount Ida region to travel to an Aegean island in his attempt to locate 
the man who had killed his 17-year-old uncle in 1959 and then, after release from 
prison, had emigrated to the island in order to avoid the consequences of his act. The 
crime had taken place twenty-two years before the avenger’s birth. The offender 
visited the man at work and shot him.  
 
In addition, material is drawn on relating to a crime committed in 1987, where the 
victim was a 15-year-old boy who was avenged by his father two years later. It is 
argued here that certain aspects of this case are related to the main argument of this 
article. One significant indication of this is contained in a manuscript written by the 
father-avenger, which can be taken as a kind of ‘conversation’ with his dead son. The 
manuscript reveals a discourse about what he must do as father in order to honour 
his beloved son. The father wrote this text, approximately 10.000 words long, over 
the two years after the death of his son and then proceeded to his vengeance, 
fulfilling the expectations of the blood feud.  
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Social Significance of Crime and Memory 
At the core of the feud is a crime that becomes associated with values of symbolic 
capital, namely a crime is, or has the potential to be, committed in circumstances that 
create a competition to preserve or improve symbolic capital. In mountainous Crete, 
the people use terms such as ‘self-respect’, ‘honour’, ‘gravity’, ‘pride’ (egoismos) or 
‘prestige’ to refer to these values of symbolic capital.8 It can be argued that two of 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisations (a ‘shared silence’ about rationality and calculability in 
the economy of symbolic exchanges; and the social prerequisites for the existence of 
symbolic capital) are very useful in illuminating the social and cultural significances of 
crimes sustained over time, namely blood feuds. Bourdieu points out a ‘shared 
silence’ or an ‘open secret’ in the economy of symbolic exchanges (e.g. gifts, 
benevolences etc.) disguises the actual material interests with double, ambiguous 
and indefinite social meanings which, like a ‘magical power’, reinforce their imposition 
and at the same time ensures their reproduction.9 In the Cretan blood feud, as an 
‘exchange of crimes’ between two kinship groups, the symbolic aspects of the 
‘exchange’ are emphasised by local people as they assign it discourses about the 
commitment of crimes motivated by a customary system of values about honour. 
These local discourses are elaborations of an understood system intended mainly for 
arguments in the public domain or for addressing outsiders. In addition, such 
elaborations appear publicly in fictional versions of revenge by some novelists, or 
more recently, in some popular Greek television serials in Greece. This results in a 
justifying, before the gaze of a wider society, of specific forms of crime – ones that 
are labelled ‘crimes committed to protect personal or family honour’. It presents them 
as extreme but necessary value-driven actions.  
 
However, from a different perspective, symbolic capital is an inseparable part of 
every society’s material reality, and is not automatically associated with the necessity 
for criminal action. For example, taking into account that, in any society, one tangible 
proof of a man’s symbolic capital is the extent of his network of social relationships, 
acting as supporters of his choices and actions. Thus, the shepherd who invests time 
and care in maintaining an extensive social network to ensure access to pasturage 
                                                 
8
 For more discussion about these values, see Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage; Peristiany 
(ed), Honor and Shame; David Gilmore (ed.), Honour and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean 
(American Anthropological Association, Washington, 1987); Albera Dionigi, Anton Blok, L'anthropologie 
de la Méditerranée/Anthropology of the Mediterranean (Maisonneuve et Larose. Maison 
méditerranéenne des sciences de l’homme, 2001).  
9
 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action, (Polity Press, 1998), Chap. 5: ‘The 
Economy of Symbolic Goods’, pp. 92-123, especially p. 97. 
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and to protect against sheep stealing has the potential for ownership of significant 
capital through his ‘ownership’ of a substantial social personality. A principal 
precondition for success in modern occupations (trade, business etc.) is also the 
possession of an extended social network, which acts as a moral guide to the 
choices made by customers or clients to use the possessor of the capital. From this 
perspective, the actions of a man that can be conceived of as insulting to the social 
personality of another man has, additionally, the sense of being a challenge to his 
material resources. 
 
Bourdieu also asserts that one (diffuse) aspect of symbolic capital rested ‘solely on 
collective recognition’.10 Alternatively, using Durkheimean terms, such symbolic 
capital or social personality can be considered as an element of collective 
representations, because they do not stem from an individual consciousness but 
instead are accepted and shared by all members of the local society. Solicitude for 
relatives, performative acts of munificence (e.g., treats in the coffeehouses, 
donations or charities etc.), protecting the chastity of daughters, reaction to every 
attempt at insult with words or actions against the insulter’s person or his relatives 
are the main socially-acknowledged modes of action every man has to demonstrate 
at all times as evidence of his possession symbolic capital, and comprehension of its 
values.11 The local notion of kozi (literally, prestige) encompasses this set of values. 
In the eyes of local society, men and kin groups are stratified according to their 
possession of high kozi, low kozi or little kozi. The evidence for the magnitude of a 
man or a kin group’s kozi is the extent of the network of social relations, providing 
support or collaboration for social and political actions or decisions.12 Such values of 
symbolic capital are also bound up in the notion of a person,13 making it in this sense 
a concept which as it is ‘relational rather than possessive’; consequently ‘there is no 
clear divide between past and present or collective and individual’.14 It is, for local 
people, a locus in which are reflected the family and baptismal names (as signs of 
the belonging to a specific clan, of the order of birth, of the resurrection of an 
                                                 
10
 Bourdieu, Practical Reason. p. 50. 
11
 On the performative aspects of these values in mountainous Crete, see Herzfeld, The Poetics of 
Manhood, mainly chapter four, pp. 123-62. 
12
 For a more detailed analysis of the notions of kozi and kozali men see Tsantiropoulos, Vendetta, pp. 
173-80. 
13
 According to Mauss, the concept of the person constitutes a social category. In particular, he argues, 
in primitive societies each member is conceived as a supra-individual, namely as a part of a 
cosmological order, and as such, is the embodiment of a set of past and present relationships. Marcell 
Mauss, ‘A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self’ in M. Carrithers et al 
(eds), The Category of the Person (Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
14
 Michael Lambek, ‘Memory in a Maussian Universe’, in S. Radstone and K. Hodgkin (eds), Regimes of 
Memory, (Routledge, 2003) p. 205. 
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ancestor in the person who shares the name, and of gender). Over and above, these, 
are reflected also expectations for the appropriation of rules, qualities, skills or 
actions commonly accepted by all members of society. The specific conjunction of 
notions of shared identity values reflected in naming practices may be noted in the 
case of the 25-year-old shepherd.15 He avenged his uncle’s death by killing the 
hospital porter who was, in turn, a very distant relative of the man who killed the 
shepherd’s uncle but who happened to have the same name and family name. As 
the court proceedings reveal, the killing of a person with the same name and family 
name as the murderer of the shepherd’s uncle was, for him, a matter of victim 
substitution, where the shepherd was wrought to the fever-pitch necessary to 
committing the crime because of the shared specific name. 
 
In this perspective, every individual’s social actions contribute significantly to the 
shared, common affairs of his kinship group, not only as a fact of a present, but also 
of a future, eventuality. As part of their existence, and continued reproduction, these 
values are publicly manifested. Consequently, everyone within the local community is 
aware of the process involved in keeping the balance sheet when allocating symbolic 
capital between individuals and kinship groups. It is within these ideas about complex 
and interwoven personal and kinship group values that the social and cultural 
implications of both a decision to commit a crime, and its consequences, are 
conceptualised. The perpetrator is impelled to commit the crime because he feels 
that another man does not acknowledge these values in his person or his family, 
whether the assault is verbal or actual. The choice of victim is not random: it is either 
the actual assailant or one of his close and beloved male kin. The killing of a woman 
or an old man is deemed to be a shameful and dastardly action because of the lower 
status of these member categories within the sibling group. By contrast, the killing of 
a young man constitutes an attack on the social power of his entire kin group, 
because his siblings are thereby deprived of a member who eventually would have 
reinforced that whole group via the capacities he demonstrated. After a crime has 
been committed, the victim’s sibling group is placed in the position of possessing the 
debt of blood (hrostoun aima), to use the local term of reference for the obligation of 
avenging the insult. It is within the same value context as ideas linking personal and 
                                                 
15
 It is not accidental that when local people make initial contact with a stranger in Crete (mainly in 
villages), it is customary to address him through three questions. Firstly they ask for his baptismal name, 
secondly his place of origin, and thirdly his family name. The stranger, in answering each of these 
questions, reveals his personal identity in sequence which is perceived by the locals to be framed within 
a specific religion, a place of origin and a clan. For more on the social practice and strategy of giving a 
name to a specific individual, see Bernard Vernier, I Koinoniki genesi ton esthimaton. Prototokoi ke 
Defterotokoi stin Karpatho Η Κοινωνική Γένεση των Αισθημάτων (Alexandria editions, 2001).  
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kinfolk worth that the victim’s siblings conceive of the crime as an attack on the social 
power of the whole kinship group.  
 
This deriving of personal worth from collective representations and the linkage of 
every kinship group’s corporate achievements with the personal capacities of specific 
relatives to effect an improvement in their kin group’s standing through their actions, 
strategies and choices denotes that these capacities can be attributed to persons 
even after their death.16 This is especially so if death occurred at a young age where, 
based on social actions up to the time of death, the potential for adding prestige are 
acknowledged, mainly by the kin group.17 The father of the 15-year-old boy was, in 
his manuscript, mourning for the elimination of a corporeality which epitomised in his 
foreshadowing of the potential loss key values:  
You are dead now, a man who was overflowing with humanity and 
pride, having qualities and abilities in your life that were very clear. 
[These were] empathy and solicitude for others, sociability but 
above all magnanimity. 
[To shoot at you and kill you] constitutes a terminal gunshot to the 
whole of our kinship group.  
 
Χάζεθεο, έλαο άλζξσπνο γεκάηνο πξώηκε αλζξσπηά θηιόηηκν 
γξακκέο θαη αξρέο μεθαζαξηζκέλεο ( ζπκπόλνηα, πξνζηαζία,  
θνηλσληθόηεηα) αιιά πξηλ απόια κεγάιε ςπρή εθηειεζηηθή βνιή 
γηα ην ζπίηη καο [Original Greek text] 
 
The father’s defence, in court, of the 25-year old shepherd who killed the hospital 
porter also demonstrated an alignment with conceptions interweaving the group’s 
potential for improvement in status with the virtues and abilities of specific kin group 
members. In this case, the killing of an individual is displayed as having a destructive 
collective impact. The defendant’s father stated:   
I have a brother who is treated in a mental clinic. He was an officer in the army 
but after my brother’s death in 1958, he became seriously ill. I also have a 
sister who is hospitalised in a mental clinic. My brother and sister became ill 
just after our brother’s death.…When my brother was killed, he was twenty-five 
years old. His death was a great shock to all of us and because of that, our 
                                                 
16
 There is an extended discussion in anthropology on the concept of corporateness. In this article, I use 
the term to denote the transition from the grouping via kinship ties to a level of group formation in which 
solidarity in social, economic and political activities strengthens or reinstates the kin ties (see for 
example James Dow, ‘On the Muddle Concept of Corporation in Anthropology’, American 
Anthropologist, 1973, 75(3) pp. 904-08; George Appel, ‘Methodological Problems with the Concepts of 
Corporation, Corporate Social Grouping and Cognatic Descent Group’, American Ethnologist, 10(2) 
(1983) pp. 302-11, etc.. In the case of Crete, corporateness presupposes the existence of one or more 
persons in the kinship group with high social prestige in order to reinforce its unity. 
17
 In my fieldwork, while investigating the retaliatory crimes I concluded that in cases where the victim 
was an old man, there were fewer possibilities for revenge and the reaction was towards the mitigation 
of hostility between groups through strategies of intermarriages. In contrast, if the deceased was a 
young and unmarried male, even if he was killed accidentally (for example because of a car accident or 
celebratory gun fires during a fiesta) there was a clear potential for revenge.  
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brother and sister are kept in a mental clinic. I never talked to my children about 
my brother’s death. It ripped us apart and our children must have heard about 
it.  
 
In the court proceedings, his son, the defendant, also asserted that the primary 
incentives for his action were the murder of his uncle and the fact that another uncle 
and aunt had been committed to a mental clinic as a consequence of that loss.  
 
In the narration, the crime can be viewed as a memory trace for the suffering kinship 
groups. It can further be argued that the crime acquires specific social and cultural 
significations that verge on the notion of ‘cultural trauma’. Alexander sees this as 
occurring particularly ‘when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected 
to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, 
marking their memories for ever, and changing their future identity in fundamental 
and irrevocable ways’.18  
 
The notion of cultural trauma in the case of revenge is different from that developed 
with reference to great historical events such as the Holocaust, slavery in Africa, civil 
and international wars,19 or even the attack on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 
September 2001.20 Dominick LaCapra makes a distinction between historical trauma 
and structural trauma, where the former is specific and is ‘related to particular events’ 
while the latter is ‘related to (or even correlated with) transhistorical absence 
(absence of/at the origin)’.21  He defines characteristic structural trauma as the 
separation from the (m)other, the passage from nature to culture,22 the eruption from 
pre-oedipal or pre-symbolic to the symbolic, the entry into language, the inevitable 
generation of aporia etc..23 It can be argued that, for the victim’s group, the revenge 
crime acquires connotations that approach the concept of ‘structural trauma’ for 
reasons derived from local notions about the integration of vengeance with certain 
aspects of social organization in feuding societies. In particular, one of the main 
                                                 
18
 Jeffrey Alexander, ‘Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma’ in Jeffrey Alexander, Ron Eyerman, 
Bernhard Giesen, Neil Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka (eds.), Cultural Trauma Theory and Applications. 
(University of California Press 2004) p. 1. 
19
 For an critical review of many works about memory mainly in its relation with historical facts, see Peter 
Fritzsche, ‘Review Article: The Case of Modern Memory’, The Journal of Modern History, 73 (2001), pp. 
87-117; Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the 
Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices’, Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998), pp. 105-40. 
20
 See, for example, Alison Young, ‘Images in the Aftermath of Trauma: Responding to September 
11th’, Crime, Media, Culture, 3 (1) (2007) pp. 30-48.  
21
 Dominick LaCapra, ‘Trauma, Absence , Loss’, Critical Inquiry 25 (4) (1999), pp. 696-727, especially 
pp. 724; 722. 
22
 This trauma is elaborated in Freud’s book Civilization and its Discontents in James Strachey (ed) 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Hogarth Press, 1961) pp. 
64–145. 
23
 Dominick LaCapra, ‘Trauma’ p. 722. 
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characteristics of these structural traumas is that they are typical of myth and consist 
of a ‘founding trauma’ or in other words, a ‘trauma that paradoxically becomes the 
basis for collective and/or personal identity’.24 
   
In the case of the mountains of Crete, many local narratives about the origins of 
contemporary clans possess the following pattern. In a past, from around the middle 
of the eighteenth century onwards, one or more brothers migrated to the Mount Ida 
region to avoid retaliation as a consequence of crimes committed in their place of 
origin. There were no reports on female migration because, as it is dishonourable to 
avenge a crime by killing an individual woman, they were not chosen as victims. 
These migrants survived in their new locations, working for local people as farm 
labourers or shepherds. Usually they changed their family name or used a fictive one 
in the local community to avoid being found and killed by the victim’s siblings.25 They 
married local women and, through their offspring, increased their kinship group but 
creating a new group, because of the new family name. In these narratives about 
contemporary crime and forced migration, there is a familiar pattern apart from where 
there was reluctance on the part of bureaucratic state mechanisms to permit family 
name changes, and the expansion in new settlement locales. These include big 
Greek cities (Athens, Thessalonica) or locations outside Greece in Europe, the USA 
and Australia. The core of the memory of a crime, particularly those which occurred 
in a more distant past, is contextualised by the same cultural significations. Notably 
these are its circumstances, (in other words, its identification as an attack against the 
values of honour) and its consequences (essentially, the forced migration of key 
males, changes in family name and the creation of a new kinship group). By contrast, 
more detailed descriptions of the process of conflict or information about the 
perpetrator or victim are peripheral. Therefore, the past crime takes on the precise 
cultural connotations of a fact of absolute destruction in a previous place and, at the 
same time, a fact of resurgence in a new place. Ultimately, these ambiguous 
connotations of the crime become part of the structural components in the creation of 
the origin myth for a new kinship group.  
 
Many scholars have also pointed out the cultural components of the crime element in 
blood feud from different perspectives. Black-Michaud defines feud as ‘a ritual of 
social relations’ because it is, just like ritual, a repeated and socially-accepted form of 
                                                 
24
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25
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behaviour in which the symbolic predominates over the clearly-stated desire to 
achieve material goals and it also establishes the exact nature of relationship 
(affinity, dominance, submission) in social situations in which ambiguity exists.26 
However, in this logic of drawing parallels between blood feud and ritual there is a 
crucial difference. It is that in the case of revenge, no explicit local discourse exists 
which would make cohesive descriptions or justifications about this ‘custom’, as has 
been indicated to be so in the case of ritual by many anthropologists. Hannah Arendt 
refers to the ‘chain reaction’ of revenge as long as in a feuding society the crime 
reinscribes and reiterates the past, entering it into a potentially endless chain.27 
According to Rene Girard’s argument of reconnection mimesis and desire, blood feud 
is the phenomenon of mimetic violence par excellence because it is a violence 
revealing that that desire arises through the imitation of another’s desire; and finally, 
that the origins of desire are neither biological or instinctual nor simply a response to 
some desirable object.28 The French thinker, studying the social dimensions of 
mimetic rivalry based mainly on literature and Hebrew Scriptures, identifies a desire 
that is subjected to mimesis as a fundamental one; one that defines the totality of 
human behaviour. In the blood feud, because the conflict is drawn out over time and 
succeeding generations are involved, the object of hostility dissolves in the heat of 
this conflict and mimetic rivalry degenerates into conflict for the sake of conflict. 
Finally, each rival becomes a mirror image of the other, returning tit-for-tat endlessly. 
They become what Girard calls ‘mimetic doubles’.29 
 
Drawing data from Crete, one can also detect how, through forms of local oral 
traditions or narrations, the cultural significances of retaliatory crime are transmitted 
to succeeding generations. In one tale uncovered in my fieldwork, where there was a 
revenge killing of a husband, the wife had a new-born boy. The husband’s bloody 
clothes were preserved by the wife while her son grew up, asking constantly about 
his father, to be told that he would find out the truth when he was old enough. When 
the boy reached adulthood, his mother gave him his father’s bloody clothes and the 
name of the killer. The son immediately put on his father’s bloody clothes and took 
revenge for his father’s death. Similarly in the case of the young man who avenged 
                                                 
26
 Black Michaud, Cohesive Force, pp. 235; 224-225. 
27
 Hanna Arendt, The Human Condition, quoted in B. Lang, ‘Holocaust, Memory and Revenge: The 
Presence of the Past’, Jewish Social Studies 2 (1996), pp. 1–20. 
28
 Rene Girard et al, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (Stanford University Press, 
1987). 
29
 Ibid¸ pp. 12, 142. 
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his uncle’s death, when arrested he immediately admitted that his responsibility, 
saying: ‘I grew up looking at my uncle’s grave and photograph’.30 
 
Examining lamentation also adds insight into the cultural significances of revenge 
crime. According to Caraveli, lamentation is not a device for restriction and isolation 
but a woman’s performance to a community, possessing aesthetic, ritual, and social 
elements and making it instead an ‘avenue for social commentary on the larger 
world’.31 In one Cretan lament recorded in folk literature, a pregnant wife mourns 
beside the corpse of her husband, killed for revenge, and hurls curses against the 
murderer and his kinsfolk.32 Addressing her dead husband, she concludes her lament 
as follows:  
Don’t worry / my beloved / the one who will take revenge on you / is 
now resting in my body.33 
 
Μα κε βαξπζθνηίδεζαη /  λεθξό κνπ θππαξίζζη / θη απηόο πνπ ζα ζε 
γδηθεζεί / ζην ζπιάρλν κνπ ζηαιίζε (=αλαπαύεηαη πξνζσξηλά). 
(Original Greek text) 
 
In another Cretan lament the mother, beside the corpse of her dead son, exclaims:  
 
My son Yannis, didn’t I tell you, didn’t I say, 
That bullets are on loan? 34 
Γηάλλε κνπ δε ζνπ ηώιεγα, Γηάλλε κνπ δε ζνπ ηώπα  
πώο είλαη νη κπάιεο (=νη ζθαίξεο) δαλεηθέο (Original Greek text) 
 
In summary, in discussing the ethnographic paradigm of Cretan feuding society, it 
can be argued that, because of the encompassing nature of the blood feud as social 
phenomenon, it configures a habitus for local people. This can be defined as ‘a 
mental structure which, having been inculcated into all minds socialised in a 
particular way, is both individual and collective’.35 Furthermore, one can assume the 
formation of an embodied ‘vengeance habitus’ which constitutes a consensus – a 
doxa or a ‘natural attitude’ to use in Bourdieu’s terminology – about the commitment 
of a revenge crime as a prescribed reaction in certain situations.  
 
                                                 
30
 This statement is from the police record in the official court proceedings. 
31
 Anna Caraveli, ‘The Bitter Wounding: The Lament as Social Protest in Rural Greece’ in Jill Dubisch 
(ed.), Gender and Power in Rural Greece  (Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 169-194, especially, p. 
191. 
32
  Nikos Aggelis, Kritikos Laikos Thrinos. Mirologia kai Mirologistres (Athens, 1966). 
33
  Ibid. 
34
  Ibid. 
35
 Bourdieu, Practical Reason, p. 66. 
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The empathic consensus also drives the mechanism whereby this embodied habitus, 
so crucial to the transference of the memory of past crime, is assumed by 
succeeding generations, because of its decisive role in the transformation of the lived 
experience (or Experience I) that relates to the particular conditions of a crime’s 
commission in perceived experience ( or Experience II) of that crime.36 
 
Past Crime and the Content of Collective Memory 
The specific social and cultural significance of a crime in a feuding society affects the 
memory content of this extreme, but nevertheless condoned, deed. As a result, it 
therefore affects the manner of its transmission to succeeding generations. This 
raises paradigmatic questions, on a more abstract level, about interconnections 
between past and present. The totality of the social phenomenon of the feud which 
enables a shifting of local conceptions about a crime from an individual set of actions 
or events onto a grid of local significations affects the content of that memory. It 
becomes transformed into a generalised memory, enabling a past trace to persist 
into the present. The significance of a blood debt for the victim’s group, and the 
socially-accepted forms of actions and strategies undertaken by a perpetrator’s 
kinsfolk to defuse the conflict and prevent retaliatory crime, can be considered as 
paths that transcend the dichotomies between past and present. According to Pierre 
Norra’s definition of memory (and its contradiction of history as the representation of 
the past), this process transforms the memory of a past crime into ‘a perpetually 
actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present’.37 Halbwachs  
 proposes that a particular past is preserved and persists into the present because it 
remains relevant for present cultural formations, highlighting an aspect of the blood 
feud which is most apparent when examining its political dimensions.38 It is within 
these frameworks that the reasons given for his action by the young man who 
avenged a crime committed 22 years before his birth must be interpreted. Local 
people informed me that his fellow villagers had reminded him of his blood debt 
(χρέος αίματος) in appropriate social situations. His statements to the police 
immediately after his arrest confirm this; that because of his unpaid ‘debt’, his peers 
had called him names such as chicken, coward and had even avoided his 
company.39 
 
                                                 
36
 According to E. R. Thompson, ‘The Politics of Theory’ in R. Samuel (ed.), People’s History and 
Socialist Theory, (Routledge Kegan Paul, 1981) pp. 396–409.  
37
 Piere Norra, ‘Between Memory and History: Les lieux de memoire’, Representations, 26 (1989) p. 7-
24. 
38
 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, (University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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Focusing on the complex of intra-group relations, it can be argued that the social 
memory of a man killed (usually in the recent past) has the potential to take on the 
form of an imago in the collective memory of his blood relatives. In The Language of 
Psycho-analysis, Laplanche and Pontialis defined the concept of ‘imago’ as the 
‘unconscious prototypical figure which orientates the subject’s way of apprehending 
others; it is built up on the basis of the first real and phantasied relationships within 
the family environment’.40 Taking into account this definition of the concept of imago, 
I argue that it can, as an analytical tool, elucidate aspects of issues about the 
transference of the memory of past crime to a succeeding generation, with the result 
that it creates amongst that generation’s members the motives for a prescribed, but 
extreme, counter-action: the retaliatory crime. The potential for this is there because 
the process involves an imago constructed from a set of values that derive less from 
an individual’s real abilities or potentialities and more from socially-accepted ways of 
assessing that individual’s possession of a set of values according to the 
community’s notions of kozi (prestige) and the kozali man. These personal values are 
part of a collective representation, and consequently consist of a set of commonly 
shared values; and these accomplishments are accepted through specific 
interpretations of social actions. This means that, especially for his kinship group, the 
imago of a dead person opens channels for the construction of imaginary scenarios 
about the positive contribution to the wellbeing of his kinship group he would have 
made by the end of his natural life. More explicitly, in the case of Cretan feuding 
society, the imago of a dead person can take on a form where his potential is 
mediated by present social realities or by inter- or intra-kin group relations, because 
the imaginary residue of one or other of the participants in a interpersonal situation 
that the concept of the imago evokes is mainly constructed out of collective 
representations of what constitutes an individual.41 From this perspective, it is not a 
matter of random chance that in all cases of retaliatory crimes examined in this article 
a man has taken revenge for a crime many years after its commitment – many years 
after his own birth too – with an intensity of emotion animated by the youth of the 
deceased relative. In other words, the victim had been killed at an age deemed 
crucial to enable their kinsfolk to make judgement about their potential value. It is 
worth noting that in all the cases examined here, the avenged victims were under 25. 
                                                 
40
 J. Laplanche and J-B. Pontalis, The language of psycho-analysis, (Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psycho-analysis, 1983) p. 211). 
41
 For this reason, the concept of imago is used as an analytical tool, rather than that of complex. They 
both deal with the relations between the child and its social and family environment. However, the notion 
of complex refers to the effects upon the subjects of interpersonal relations as a whole, whereas the 
notion of imago is closer to the subject’s stereotypical view of other person. Laplanche and Pontalis,  
Language of Psycho-analysis, p. 211. 
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Freud makes a distinction between mourning and melancholia, where the first is 
defined as the common reaction to ‘the loss of a loved person, or to a loss of some 
abstraction’ (country, liberty, an ideal).42 When loss is converted into absence, one 
faces the impasse of an endless melancholia where it is impossible to experience 
mourning, a process for the accepting of loss, and to transfer life energy from a focus 
on anything associated with the beloved object. Melancholia dominates in situations 
of a palpable but also generalised loss, as the libido (life energy) is transferred to the 
self that is equated with the lost figure. The result is to feel the Ego poorer (and not 
the world, as it is in the case of mourning). In other words, the very loss refers not 
just to the beloved object but also to the Ego.43 In Green’s definition, absence is a 
fruitless fatal negation whereas loss is a negative positiveness.44 LaCapra argues 
that in melancholia, ‘empathy with the victim seems to be an identity’ and that in this 
post-traumatic situation, a situation that melancholic ‘relives or acts out the past’.45 
Absence is plain in the following remarks from a diary belonging to a father whose 
son was killed at the age of 16:  
We will come (to your grave) to cheer your loneliness because you 
must know that you live in our memories. It is only that we can’t see 
you any more and talk with you as we used to do in the past…I care 
less about my life and much more about saving your memory… But 
we try to see you amongst us, to speak with you though your 
absence is noticeable…My pure and unoffending son, how is it 
possible for me to remove you from my heart or from my mind? I 
have the right to hold your presence as I want and to keep it at the 
place I want for ever.  
 
Θα έξζνπκε λα δεζηάλνπκε ηελ κνλαμηά ζνπ κε ηελ παξνπζία καο 
γηαηί κε ηελ κλήκε καο είζαη θνληά καο κνλάρα πνπ δελ ζε 
βιέπνπκε λα ζπδηηήζνπκε όπσο ζπδηηνύζακε δηάθνξα…ιηγόηεξν 
ζθέπηνκαη ηε δσή κνπ θαη πεξηζζόηεξν ηελ κλήκε απηνύ πνπ αληί 
λα πξνζηαηέςνπλ έθαγαλ (ελλνεί: ζθόησζαλ)….Κη όκσο 
πξνζπαζνύκε λα ζε δνύκε αλάκεζά καο λα κηιήζνπκε καδί ζνπ θαη 
ε απνπζία ζνπ είλαη αηζζεηή.…Καη εζύ αγλέ άθαθε άλζξσπέ κνπ 
πώο ζα θύγεηο από ηελ ςπρή κνπ ή ηελ ζθέςε κνπ; Έρσ δηθαίσκα 
λα ζε θξαηώ όπσο ζέισ θαη λα ζερσ εθεί πνπ ζέισ γηα πάληα. 
(Original Greek text). 
 
Two years later, the father took revenge for him, and so he ended up as the victim in 
a blood feud.  
                                                 
42
 S. Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, in James Strachey (ed. and transl.) The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIX (London and Hogarth Press, 1981) p. 243. 
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44
 Nikos Nikolaidis, I Anaparastasi. Psychanalytiko Dokimio (Rappa Editions, 1985) p. 18. 
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Apart from the predominance of concepts of the individual which permit the 
development of imaginary scenarios about the nature of the future contribution a 
murdered man would have made to his kinship group, the sense of absence and the 
underlying melancholia state is further strengthened by the specific content of the 
local discourse about revenge that contextualises the memory of a past crime as it is 
transmitted to succeeding generations. During fieldwork in the Cretan mountains, I 
ascertained that when men were speaking about a heroic and valorous historical 
past, trying to connect it to their contemporary collective identity,46 the blood feud as 
an accepted customary reaction to an insult was not a constituent element in such 
narrations of heroic actions, as the following example reveals. In 1955, in a mountain 
village in central Crete, on saint’s day for local saint and protector, St. Fanourio, the 
whole community was celebrating with food, drink and dancing. Two villagers 
quarrelled because one suspected the other of betraying his father to the Nazis 
during the German occupation of Crete (1941-1945). During the quarrel, the accuser 
drew his knife and killed the other and many fellow villagers then became involved in 
what became a local ‘war’. As the conflict spread to encompass the whole 
community, six people were killed and twenty-two wounded. The ‘war’ was settled 
after the interference of the police and the army.  
 
The reality of a traumatic event like this affects the current social life of the whole 
community, something emphasised by including a recent crime (2006) which was 
identified as being linked to the blood-feud ignited a half century previously. It is 
worth noting that after 1955, the community concerned stopped celebrating its local 
saint’s day with magnificent devotional feasts. To date, worship of the local saint is 
confined to the liturgy in church, participated in by the congregation. A book on the 
recent history of the village by the local school teacher makes only a brief reference 
to the traumatic events of 1955.47 The teacher comments:  
 
Trivial reasons, mainly linked to the sense of contempt experienced 
by the principal perpetrator felt, but also, as he personally told us, 
due to suspicious actions of his fellow villagers in their relations with 
him, fuelled the fire of the calamity – since evil had already 
prevailed, as so often happens in similar circumstances. 
Specifically, he stabbed and killed the man who he suspected was 
his enemy. Soon afterwards, the entire village was literally ‘burning’, 
being transformed into an inferno of shootings and explosions. 
                                                 
46
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Someone threw a hand grenade into the house of the first victim. 
Three people were killed and twenty-two wounded. Additionally, two 
kinsmen of the initial perpetrator were shot and killed. In total, six 
people lost their lives. The situation appeared to be out of control, 
and uncertainty made the state of affairs more even perilous due to 
the intensity of vindictive emotions at that time. Fortunately, a large 
police force along with military reinforcements, both recruited from 
almost all regions of Crete, arrived and gradually restored peace.48 
 
What is noteworthy in this extract is the depiction of the recent history of the village. 
In contrast to the outbreaks of fighting occurring across the region such as the heroic 
struggles of villagers against Ottoman rule (1649-1898) or against the Germans 
(1941-45), this author describes, very thoroughly, the reasons why the igniting of a 
war-like conflict is confined to a generalised conception of what constitutes honour 
and personal insult. One has the sense that it is almost a taboo for him even to name 
the perpetrators, victims or families involved in the blood-feud. Instead, his style of 
writing seems to constitute an attempt to exorcise the event. Listening to local people 
narrating such revenge incidents, what is noticeable is that the motive and the logic 
of such events echo the quotation cited above.  
 
The implications of local discourses about blood feud –  the ‘predominance of the law 
of silence’ as mass media reports define them – are plausible when it is realised that 
there cannot be a discourse justifying a crime. The individual killed may be classified 
as a ‘mimetic double’ of the offender, according to the Girardean scheme, rather than 
as a differentiated Other (for instance, a conqueror or a warlike adversary). This is so 
that individual may be labelled an enemy, meaning that any violence against him can 
be justified. In contrast, in a blood feud the enemy is a fellow villager – a neighbour or 
even a relative – people so close that intermarriage can be considered as a strategy 
for settling the affair. Essentially, the core of a revenge crime is that it was 
perpetrated in defence of an ideal, as a response to the questioning of a man’s Ego-
Ideal by another man. In terms of the concept explored in this article, the Ego-Ideal 
(defined as ‘a model to which the subject attempts to conform’)49 acquires the sum 
total of ideas of an individual’s social persona. Uncomplicated by myths, the ‘custom 
of revenge’ has the potential to make evaluations about, or descriptions and 
justifications of, a criminal action, while the consequent ‘verbal taboo’ has significant 
implications for the traumatic dimensions of memories of past crimes.50 
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In terms of intra-group relations, the ‘verbal taboo’ dominates any tendency to 
explicitness in discourse about blood-feud. This taboo, which does not entail an 
explicit verbalization of the affair which would permit a distancing, demands an 
empathic, or even passionately intense, conformity with expectations of specific 
action (revenge). This enables more crucial, self-focused evaluations of obligations 
(the avenging of a murdered ancestor) which animates the past traumatic event. 
Using Hassoun, this means that because of the lacunae created by speech 
orphanhood, the transference of a fragmented family history prevents succeeding 
generations from reconciling their family’s biographic narratives as a cohesive whole. 
In such situations characterised by the imposition of secrecy about precise 
knowledge of what is lost, melancholia results as an emotional attachment to an 
unmastered and ungrasped other.51 Cathy Garuth also links knowledge of events 
with post-traumatic situations, defining them not as episodes within the event but as 
places in the structure of its experience: as ‘a history that they [the traumatised] 
cannot entirely possess’.52 Consequently ‘to be traumatised is precisely to be 
possessed by an image or event’.53   
 
In reference to the inter-group, the existence of a discourse fraught with implications 
about local conceptualisations of the forms taken by customary crime (thanks to 
equivocal meanings, ambivalences and ambiguities) gives space for the emergence 
of contradictory interpretations of the same crime. Different individuals or groups in 
local societies will take different stances, ranging from a complete justification of the 
motives for the crime as an action taken to protect personal or family ideals, to its 
condemnation as a hideous wrong. These contradictory interpretations of the same 
action reflect social stances that are not arbitrary. Instead, they consist of choices 
and strategies of social or political significance, implying a process of estimating how 
best to obtain symbolic and material benefits from supporting one or other of the 
opposing sides in a blood feud. Consequently, viewed in a diachronic perspective, 
evaluations of the same crime may differ, or change, over time in relation to the 
general distribution of social and political power between the corporate groups that 
exist in a community. From this perspective, the memory of a past crime acquires 
political significance for two reasons. The first concerns the definition of a concept of 
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the ‘other’ and the second is the ‘opening’ of the past to the present when making 
choices or decisions.  
 
One can argue that, in this interrelation of past and present, they do not simply exist 
simultaneously if the model invoked by Norra and Holbwach is used. Instead, 
because of the specific significations of the crime for a group identity the past 
invades the present, and more specifically, the past lives in the present. The 
transhistoricality of totality of the social phenomenon of blood feud, supported by the 
implications of the local discourse, supplies the framework for experiencing a 
particular past crime as a matter of ‘deferred action’ (nachtraglichkeit) in the present. 
Laplanche and Pontalis define the Freudian concept of ‘deferred action’ as  
experiences, impressions, memory traces [that] may be revised at a 
later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a 
new stage of development. They may in that event be endowed not 
only with a new meaning but also with psychical effectiveness.54 
 
This definition refers to a process of revision of what is experienced as an external 
reality; in other words, that which is registered by memory through manifold ways into 
a form that could be absorbed into an internal reality as a wish or a fantasy. Briefly, it 
argues for a past that can be revivified and recast in terms of current hopes for the 
future.55 What is transferred to the next generations is less an elaborated narration of 
an event (a crime) that took place in certain situations and for specific reasons, and 
more the framing of such a crime by commonly-accepted values concerning honour 
and the need to defend it. This reality can be identified through the contradictions and 
omissions in local narratives about the same crime. It is obvious that this narrative 
format provides room for a perpetual revision of the same ‘fact’ to fit present 
situations. The use of the Freudian concept of ‘deferred action’ is helpful in 
comprehending why, in the examples under consideration here, the content of the 
memory of a past crime is so loaded with specific sentiments that, in shared 
situations, certain reactions are experienced by recipients of the memory in such a 
way that memory has the power to impel them to commit a responsive crime. In other 
words, it can be said that succeeding generations can potentially be in receipt of a 
past crime memory of a nature encapsulated in the following statement: ‘our present 
family’s situation would be very different if the killing of this particular [related] man 
had not taken place, because up to that point, his face and demeanour reflected that 
his kin would benefit from his life’. 
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Past crime memory, when transmitted to a succeeding generation, provides its 
recipients a shocking awakening where the perpetrator of a consequent retaliatory 
crime experiences what Benjamin describes as a flare-up of memory at ‘a moment of 
danger’.56 As can be deduced from the narratives here, the point of no return in 
committing a retaliatory crime is created by the spark that brings together past and 
present in one image. The shepherd who killed the hospital porter in 1987 asserted in 
court:  
I went and asked information from the porter about a doctor who was a relative 
of mine. The porter [after he gave information about the doctor] asked where I 
was from. Then the porter told me that one of his relatives had killed a man with 
the same surname as my own and immediately an image came to my mind, 
namely, that a man with the same name and surname as the man in front of me 
had killed my uncle …. I suddenly felt my blood running to my head, my mind 
became fogged and my only thought was to shoot him. Now I repent, but 
unfortunately it is not possible to make reparation in death. The only choice I 
had made was to surrender to the police and be taken to court …. The victim 
did not know who I was. The victim had the same name and surname as the 
murderer of my uncle and I supposed that he was a close relative of his. I 
couldn’t control myself. It was something like a hidden force that urged me to 
do it. My father never told me to do such a thing 57. 
 
The statements of the young man who travelled to the Aegean in 2005, to avenge a 
crime committed in 1958, provide similar echoes: 
When I saw the sign with his name and the map of Crete on it, I started 
wondering if he was the man who had killed my uncle or someone else who 
had the same name. At first I was scared because I was in a foreign place very 
close to my uncle’s murderer. I cannot describe how I felt exactly but it was 
certain that I was very upset. I took the decision to meet him. I went into his 
shop and I asked to see the boss. He appeared from inside and told me that he 
and his sons were the bosses. I had never seen him until that time, not even in 
a photograph … [then the perpetrator continued to have a conversation with the 
victim so as to be sure about the identity of the murderer of his uncle, and after 
that he described the motives of his action]... The moment I saw him I became 
obsessed with the realisation that he was the murderer of my uncle. This 
meeting tormented me psychologically a great deal.58  
 
A few hours later, the young man returned and shot his uncle’s murderer. 
 
Conclusions and Epilogue 
Drawing upon data collected during fieldwork in Crete and concentrating on the 
social phenomenon of the blood feud, this article has elaborated upon the content of 
                                                 
56
 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Iluminations: Essays and Reflections 
Random House, New York, 1988, p.255. 
57
 Defendant’s statement, in the official court proceedings.  
58
 Defendant’s statement, in the official court proceedings.  
Crimes and Misdemeanours 2/1 (2008) ISSN 1754-0445 
 
80 
 
a memory that becomes configured in reference to a crime. A resulting extreme 
reaction acting as a symbolic custom of the present is created by the transformation 
of a past crime into a presently-traumatic event, which then constitutes itself as a key 
influence within the group’s identity. Based on case studies of avengers who were 
unborn when the previous crime took place, the main thesis was formulated by 
asking the following questions. For the men who had no experience or awareness of 
an actual vengeance killing, how (and in what form) did a memory of a previous 
crime against a kin group member form? In what ways was it transmitted to their 
generation, resulting in patterns of extreme reactions, specifically the commission of 
a fresh crime and resultant experience of the consequences, including imprisonment 
or the loss of more beloved kin group members, when/if they, in turn, became victims 
of retaliatory crime? 
 
It has been shown that, at least in the context of Crete’s feuding society, memory of a 
past crime constitutes a social memory, the content of which is characterised by a 
perpetual resurgence of the original accompanying emotions in the present and its 
consequent life within the framework of the blood feud. The fact that a taboo existed 
on explicating fully the situation of the original crime in local discourses about 
vengeance, allied to the dominance of the symbolic in the interpretation of the social 
meanings of the action of killing a man, are effective as they work unconsciously. 
They trigger intense emotions and identifications with the deceased, while inhibiting 
the development of any subsequent rationalisation of the past event. Although the 
avenger of a past crime might not have actually experienced the event, he can be so 
overwhelmed with strong emotions that he feels compelled to release them in a 
socially-accepted form, namely revenge. In the final analysis, the action of avenging 
a past crime is the result of experiencing an invasion of the past into the present. 
Focusing on the broader perspective of memory, its transference and awakening of 
emotions, this article has drawn upon concepts from psychoanalysis to elucidate 
issues of a specific social and cultural context that refer to an individual’s impulse for 
the creation and reproduction of forms of actions such as crime, which could 
otherwise simply be characterised as deviant or morbid. As this article has 
demonstrated, the reality of the blood feud is much more complex. 
 
